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Abstract 
We investigate the hypothesis that the same investors trade differently in different financial 
markets. We use a proprietary data base with the transaction records of 129,461 investors 
for a 10-year period, and select the investors holding both stocks and warrants in the port-
folio. We compare the trading behavior of investors in the stock market and in the warrant 
market, controlling for investors’ socio-demographic characteristics (age, occupation, edu-
cation, etc.) and for investors’ behavioral biases (overconfidence, the disposition effect and 
pursuit of the pleasure of gambling).  
Even though investors are the same in both markets, our results clearly show that the soci-
odemographic determinants of the trading activity in stocks and in warrants are not all the 
same, implying that the same investors trade stocks differently than warrants. More pre-
cisely, overconfident investors have a higher warrant trading activity and a lower domestic 
stock trading activity, and investors pursuing gambling pleasure or prone to the disposition 
effect trade warrants more (but do not trade stocks more). 
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Do Individual Investors Trade Differently in Different Markets? 
 
1. Introduction 
In this paper we investigate the hypothesis that investors trade differently in different 
financial markets. More precisely, we compare the trading activity of a group of investors 
holding both stocks and warrants in their portfolio. We are particularly interested in study-
ing whether investors with certain financial behavioral biases trade differently in different 
financial markets (i.e., the stock market and the warrant market). 
Investors do not always behave rationally when making investment decisions and dis-
play many behavior biases that influence their investment decision-making processes. Be-
cause of these biases, investors can make suboptimal investment decisions that may seri-
ously harm their wealth. Some biases stem from a variety of factors and not only from one 
type of heuristic simplification. Overconfidence is probably the most widely studied behav-
ioral bias of this type. Defined as the tendency to overestimate one’s knowledge, abilities 
or the precision of the information we possess, as well as one’s capacity to estimate future 
events or to control them, overconfidence seems likely to be a key factor in financial deci-
sion-making. The tendency for individual investors to overestimate their ability to trade (the 
better than average effect) has been well-documented and seems to be a regular trait of 
the individual investor profile (Daniel and Hirshleifer 2015). However, because overconfi-
dence is not directly observable in the financial markets it is frequently apprehended by its 
consequences, such as the individual investor tendency to overtrade. Barber and Odean 
(2000) analyzed how active trading affects the overall performance of investors and con-
cluded that the more actively investors trade the more they lose. 
Another well-documented individual investor bias is the tendency to sell winners too 
soon and to keep losers too long. Behavioral finance explains this disposition effect by loss 
aversion, or by the fact that individuals dislike admitting that past purchases were mistakes 
(Chang et al, 2016), or by the fact that people's ability to learn from news depends on 
whether the news confirms these individuals' prior investment decisions (Kuhnen and Miu 
2017). This individual investor bias has been documented for American investors (Odean 
1998), for Finland (Grinblatt and Keloharju 2001), and for China (Feng and Seasholes 2005). 
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The pursuit of gambling pleasure is another key factor in financial decision-making. In-
vestors with a stronger propensity to gamble exhibit a strong preference for riskier assets 
(lottery-like stocks, Kumar 2009), and trade more frequently (Hoffmann and Shefrin 2011, 
Grinblatt and Keloharju 2009). Dorn and Sengmueller (2009) conclude that 98% of German 
discount brokerage investors report that they “enjoy investing”, and that 45% “enjoy taking 
risky positions”. Investors who report enjoying investing or gambling hold more concen-
trated portfolios and turn over their portfolio at twice the rate of their peers (Dorn and 
Sengmueller 2009). 
The above-mentioned financial biases are personal characteristics that affect the par-
ticipation and the trading behavior of investors. The hypothesis discussed here is that the 
investor’s decision to participate in a specific financial market and to trade a specific finan-
cial asset is also influenced by the specificity of that market and the singularity of the finan-
cial products. In other words, we test the hypothesis that the same investor behaves differ-
ently in different contexts, the context being defined by the market and the financial instru-
ment characteristics. 
The impact of framing on individual decision-making has been recognized since the first 
works of Kahneman and Tversky (1979) and Tversky and Kahneman (1982) on prospect the-
ory. People respond to a particular choice in different ways, depending on how the choice 
is presented. For instance, risk behavior is dependent on context. We tend to avoid risk 
when the choice is presented in a positive frame and seek risk when the choice is presented 
in a negative frame. People tend to display risk-aversion in the domain of gains and are risk 
seekers in the domain of losses. 
While the importance of framing in the context of portfolio choice has been predicted 
in the behavioral finance literature (e.g., Barberis et al. 2006), few empirical works beyond 
laboratory experiments affirm the importance of framing on individual financial investment 
decisions. Goetzman and Kumar (2008) study portfolio diversification decisions and 
whether some investors under-diversify because they examine the risks of individual stocks 
too narrowly. Closer to our work, Blackburn et al. (2014) study a sample of individual trad-
ing accounts in growth fund shares and in value fund shares, and conclude that investor’s 
attitude towards risk depends on the characteristics of the securities being traded. 
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We add to the literature regarding individual investor behavior, studying the extent to 
which the context (represented by the specific characteristics of two types of financial as-
sets: stocks and warrants) has an influence on the trading behavior of individual investors.  
To test this proposition, we use a proprietary data base with the transaction records of 
129,461 investors for the period from January 1997 to September 2006, and select the in-
vestors holding both stock and warrants in their portfolio. We compare the trading behavior 
of those investors in both markets, controlling for investors’ socio-demographic character-
istics (age, occupation, education, etc.) and for investors’ behavioral biases (overconfi-
dence, the disposition effect and the pursuit of gambling pleasure). 
The Portuguese warrant market has been considered one that had the largest growth 
in the early years of this millennium. This contributes to making the Portuguese market a 
strong candidate to conduct a natural experiment on the characterization of the investors’ 
trading behavior in warrants, a complex financial product, in contrast to the trading behav-
ior in stocks, a more traditional and easier to understand financial product. 
Our results clearly show that investors behave differently in different financial markets. 
First, the analysis of the factors that leads investors to participate in the market for warrants 
shows that the socio-demographic determinants are different from those leading them to 
participate in the stock market. Secondly, the analysis of the trading behavior of the same 
group of investors in the warrant market and in the stock market shows that those investors 
behave differently in different markets. More precisely, overconfident investors have a 
higher warrant trading activity and a lower domestic stock trading activity, and investors 
searching for the pleasure of gambling or prone to the disposition effect trade warrants 
more (but do not trade stocks more). These results are robust in considering investors’ fi-
nancial literacy, the investors’ past performance in the stock market, the time span during 
which the investor is active in the market and the inclusion of a series of control variables 
regarding investors’ financial profile (time deposits, mortgages and consumer loans). Our 
results are original, since, as far as we know, this is the first study to address individual 
investor’s dissimilar trading behavior in different financial instruments. 
The study is structured as follows: The next section provides a brief description of the 
Portuguese market and describes the database used. In section 3 a probit model is used to 
allow distinguishing the characteristics of warrant investors among the characteristics of 
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other investors and evaluate the influence of some behavioral biases on the decision to 
participate in this market. The fourth section compares the investors’ trading activity in the 
market for warrants and in the stock market. In the last section some final conclusions are 
drawn. 
 
2. The database 
2.1. The Portuguese market  
Detachable warrants came into Portuguese legislation in 1988.1 Under this regulation, 
bonds may have detachable warrants, and the bondholder has a warrant that confers on 
him the right to acquire shares at a price under predetermined conditions. This warrant is 
detached from the bond and can be freely traded on the stock market regardless of the 
bond it was detached from.  
The legal framework of covered warrants was established in 1999.2 Covered warrants 
are financial instruments that confer on the holder the right to a specific underlying asset. 
The warrant can confer the right to buy, sell or to subscribe to the underlying asset, or to 
receive a cash difference between the price of the underlying asset at the exercise date and 
the exercise price of the warrant. This right can be exercised on the maturity date or before 
that date, at a specific exercise price determined under the conditions of issue. The main 
features of covered warrants are the inherent right to buy or sell the underlying asset 
(which may be shares, bonds, stock indices, interest or exchange rates, among others), the 
exercise price (price at which one has the right to buy or sell the underlying asset), parity 
(number of warrants equal to one unit of the underlying asset), time of exercise (in the 
American type the holder can exercise this right at any time, from acquisition to maturity 
date; in the European type the owner can only exercise this right at maturity), the activation 
of the exercise (the exercise at maturity date can be automatic or not; if it is not automatic, 
the holder has to declare his intentions of exercising his right and if he does not do so his 
rights expire without being exercised) and the type of settlement (physical, if the right 
                                                 
1 Decree-Law Nº 229 B/88 (July 4th). The first issue of detachable warrants in Portugal was led by the Banco 
Comercial de Macau, in 1990. 
2 Decree-Law Nº 172/99 (May 20th) and Regulation CMVM Nº 19/99 (November 10th). The first issue of 
covered warrants (Net B@nco PSI-20) was led by Banco Santander, in September 2000. 
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holder receives, subscribes to or delivers the underlying asset by paying the exercise price; 
financial, if exercising the right gives rise to payment by the issuer of the warrant in the 
amount corresponding to the difference, if positive, between i) the market price of the 
underlying asset at the exercise date and the exercise price, multiplied by parity, in the case 
of call warrants; ii) the exercise price and the market price of the underlying  asset at 
exercise date, multiplied by parity, in the case of put warrants). 
There are multiple factors influencing the value of a warrant. Among them is the price 
of the underlying asset and its volatility, the exercise price, parity, time to maturity, the 
interest rate for the period of maturity and dividends. It is not surprising, therefore, that 
covered warrants are a much more complex financial instrument than stocks and bonds, 
and it is to be expected that warrant investors would have a better knowledge of financial 
matters than other investors do. Moreover, it is expected that an investor in this financial 
instrument is more risk tolerant or is even a risk seeker, given that uncertainty about the 
future trend of the price of the underlying asset and price volatility, together with 
substantial financial leverage, clearly increase the risks of this type of investment. 
The Portuguese market for warrants witnessed substantial growth in the early years of 
this millennium, and investors traded very actively. According to the annual reports of the 
CMVM (the Portuguese Securities Commission), between 2000 and 2009 the average 
annual value of transactions in warrants in the secondary market was around 1,210 million 
euros, representing 2.1% of the annual average value traded in the secondary market in the 
same period (excluding public debt negotiation). Moreover, between 2005 and 2009 the 
share of orders received (by financial intermediaries registered with the CMVM for the 
business of taking orders on behalf of others) on warrants from resident non-institutional 
investors accounted for about 77% of total orders received on warrants, which means that 
the importance of individual investors in this market segment is very relevant.3  
 
2.2. The data 
The main database used in this study is proprietary and contains information from one 
of the top three financial intermediaries in Portugal. The information relates to the accounts 
                                                 
3 See Mendes (2012). 
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of individual investors that were active in late September 2006 and includes socio-
demographic data (marital status, birth date, gender, education, occupation and residence) 
on the first account holder and on time deposits, consumer loans and mortgages associated 
with the account holders. In addition, information on all transactions in financial 
instruments linked to these accounts was obtained for the period from the 2nd of January 
1997 to the 16th of September 2006. This information includes the date of the transaction, 
the transaction type (purchase or sale), the ISIN code and description of the financial 
instrument, the quantity traded and the instrument price. 
In the period of about ten years covered by the database, 3,620 investors traded 
warrants and 491,540 investors traded stocks. This means that for every 136 equity 
investors only one investor traded warrants, which means that the market of this derivative 
financial instrument is composed of a very tiny percentage of the Portuguese population.4 
This may reflect the privatization programs carried out by successive governments (which 
was somehow associated with the term 'popular capitalism') which led many Portuguese 
families to invest in the stock of firms being privatized during this period, as well as the 
greater complexity of warrants (in comparison with stocks) that discouraged investment in 
this financial instrument.  
It is not surprising, therefore, that in the period covered by the database the total 
number of stock trades (3,813,845) is much greater than the warrant trades (210,958), or 
that the average number per investor is 58.3/7.8 trades in warrants/stocks.5 Indeed, many 
investors had their first contact with the stock market following the privatization of state-
owned firms, but acquired the shares in a purely buy-and-hold strategy or sold them later 
without having invested in new stocks. On the contrary, the greater complexity of warrants 
may have led some investors to specialize in this financial instrument and consequently to 
be much more active, buying and selling on market expectations that they had regarding 
the future prices of the underlying assets.  
                                                 
4 The percentage of warrant investors is far lower than reported in Hong Kong. According to SFC (2006), 12.6% 
of individual investors (those who are over 18 years-old and invest in at least one of the following assets: 
stocks, mutual funds, bonds, derivatives, structured products and others) had made transactions in warrants.  
5 In the database used by Schmitz and Weber (2007) the average investor made 55 transactions in warrants. 
However, the time period covered is only 51 months, shorter than what is used in this study. 
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The activity of Portuguese investors in warrants is illustrated in our sample by the size 
of the average trade (11,121 and 6,555 for trades in warrants and stocks, respectively)6 and 
the value of the average trade (3,884 euros and 1,860 euros, respectively, for trades in 
warrants and stocks). The average number of warrants/stocks traded by investors is 9.4/3.2 
and the maximum is 258/96, again confirming the higher activity of warrant investors.7 
A second database is also used in this study. It is a survey which was publicly released 
in May 2005 on the CMVM website.8 More than fifteen thousand individuals were 
contacted and the identified investors in securities (1,559) were interviewed. Each 
questionnaire included socio-demographic questions, questions related to the nature and 
type of the assets held by the investor and investor experience, but there were no questions 
related to the size of the portfolio, nor the amounts invested in each type of asset. It also 
included questions related to investor’s trading behaviour (frequency of transactions, 
sources of information used, etc.) and on the investor’s knowledge about financial markets 
and products. This database was used to compute proxies for the better than average, 
gambling and risk-lover variables (see next section).  
 
3. The Decision to Participate in the Warrant Market 
This section presents the results of a multivariate analysis. A probit model is used to 
allow distinguishing the characteristics of warrant investors among the characteristics of 
other investors. For this purpose, only investors who trade stocks were selected from our 
database, residents abroad were excluded. We had a total of 129,461 stock investors; 1,729 
also traded warrants during the period covered by the database.  
The base model we use to evaluate the socio-demographic characteristics of the 
warrant investor vis-à-vis the stock investor is the following: 
Warrants = f (age, gender, marital status, residence, occupation, education) 
                                                 
6 The fact that warrants have a higher leverage than stocks also contributes to the higher average quantity per 
trade. 
7 This may also result from the fact that warrants are more tailor-made financial instruments than stocks.  
8 This is a survey conducted by the CMVM between 2nd October 2000 and 22nd December 2000, aimed at 
identifying the characteristics of individual investors. The direct interview technique and a structured 
questionnaire were used. The survey identifies an investor in securities as one holding one or more of the 




Warrants: equal to 1 if the investor trades warrants during the period; 
Age: age of investor. Defined as (2006 minus year of birth of the account holder); 
Gender: equal to 1 if male; 
Marital status: equal to 1 if married; 
Residence: place of residence; equal to 1 if residing in Lisbon or Porto; 
Occupation: four categories are considered: highly skilled, if the investor has a highly skilled 
job; skilled, if the investor has a skilled job; independent, if the investor is a professional 
liberal (i.e., the investor has a job but does not have a formal labor contract with the 
company; inactive, if retired, unemployed or student.  
Education: years of schooling. Three categories are considered: low, if 4 or less years of 
education; intermediate, if more than 4 but 12 or less years of education; high, if a technical 
or higher course was completed. 
As stated earlier, the literature considers that higher risk appetite is associated with 
younger investors without family responsibilities in marriage, that more qualified 
professions (generally associated with higher income) permit taking higher risks, and that 
women have less appetite for risk (Barber and Odean 2001, Goetzmann and Kumar 2008). 
Investor behavior depends on age (DaSilva and Giannikos 2004), occupation (Christiansen 
et al. 2008) or the environment in which the investor lives (Goetzmann and Kumar 2008). 
On the other hand, seemingly irrational behavior diminishes substantially with investor 
wealth (Calvet et al. 2009) or with investor sophistication. Higher levels of education (i.e., 
more years of schooling) have also been positively associated with greater sophistication, 
and the higher the individual knowledge the more efficient and rational the financial 
behavior will be, such as planning and saving for retirement (Lusardi and Mitchell 2008), 
investing in the stock market (Christelis et al. 2010) or diversifying portfolio (Abreu and 
                                                 
9 The database does not include any variable directly linked to wealth or income of the investor, which 




Mendes 2010). In short, the investor’s characteristics may have an impact on their financial 
activity. 
We attempt to control for investors’ wealth by controlling for their job (the closest 
proxy for wealth insofar as neither the survey nor the trading database have information 
on income or wealth). To that end, dummy variables are used to identify inactive investors; 
inactive, investors with a highly skilled job; highly skilled, those with a skilled or low skilled 
job; skilled, and investors who are professional liberals; independent workers. Investor’s 
place of residence is also included as an independent variable, since investors who live in 
the larger metropolitan areas are usually more educated, are more likely to be wealthier 
and employed in the financial sector and consequently to have access to better quality in-
formation. Thus, we distinguish investors who reside in Lisbon and Porto, Lisbon+Porto, the 
two largest Portuguese cities, from investors who reside elsewhere, other.  
The model is estimated by maximum likelihood.10 These results are shown in Table 
1. In column [1] we only include the variables related to the socio-demographic 
characteristics of investors. The results indicate that, conditioned to equity investors, young 
single men who reside in the largest cities (Lisbon and Porto) and with lower academic 
qualifications have a higher probability of being investors in warrants. Regarding 
occupations, investors with highly skilled and skilled jobs are less likely to invest in and trade 
warrants; this is because our omitted employment category is dominated by retirees, which 
is likely to include an important share of wealthy investors. 
Model [2] differs from the previous one in that it includes variables related to 
behavioral biases and their impact on the decision to participate in the warrant market. 
Overconfidence can lead investors to participate in and trade financial instruments they are 
not exactly familiar with. In addition, overconfident investors tend to think they are above 
average regarding their investment skills (Taylor and Brown 1988) and consequently may 
invest more in more complex financial instruments. Overconfident investors have been 
associated with excessive risk taking (Dorn and Huberman 2005; Nosic and Weber 2010), 
and this means that they are more prone to take on risk for which there is no apparent 
                                                 
10 Regarding the educational level and occupation, the basic categories are, respectively, four (or fewer) years 




reward. We follow the Goetzmann and Kumar (2008) and Bailey et al.’s (2008) approach, 
also used in Abreu et al. (2011) and Abreu and Mendes (2017), and define an investor as 
overconfident if her/his trading activity is in the top quartile of the distribution in investors’ 
trading activity and his/her performance is in the bottom quartile of the distribution in 
investors’ performance. The underlying idea is that overconfident investors trade too much 
and consequently get lower returns on their investments (Odean 1999, Barber and Odean 
2000). We find that overconfident investors are more prone to participate in the warrant 
market, thus to invest in and trade warrants. 
Defined as the tendency to sell winning stocks too early while riding losing stocks too 
long, the disposition effect has an impact on the trading behavior of individual investors. 
This is a case of reference point dependent behavior: investors behave differently when 
they are in the gain and in the loss zone. The disposition effect has been identified in retail 
and in professional investors, and in stock (Odean 1998, Grinblatt and Keloharju 2001, Dhar 
and Zhu 2006, for example) and mutual fund investors (Bailey et al. 2011). From an exper-
iment, Ofir and Wiener (2012) conclude that investors tend to be affected by the disposi-
tion effect and favor structured product investments. We consider that disposition-prone 
investors may also adjust their behavior with their investment in warrants, a complex fi-
nancial instrument. Thus, if an investor exhibits a disposition effect in her/his stock trading 
activity then this behavioral bias may also have an impact on the decision to participate in 




Table 1 – The decision to participate in the warrant market (Probit model) 
 
 
We use the disposition variable as the proxy; it is a binary variable, equal to one if the 
investor exhibits disposition behavior in the stock trading activity, and zero otherwise. We 
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6]
Age -0.010 *** -0.019 *** -0.018 *** -0.018 *** -0.018 ***
-2.68 -4.24 -3.96 -3.68 -3.80
Age squared 0.0000 0.0001 *** 0.0001 ** 0.0001 ** 0.0001 **
0.99 2.91 2.50 2.34 2.25
Male 0.390 *** 0.145 *** 0.153 *** 0.149 *** 0.133 ***
15.66 4.79 5.02 4.86 4.17
Married -0.046 ** 0.007 0.004 0.003 0.013
-2.01 0.25 0.15 0.11 0.48
Lisbon+Porto 0.045 ** 0.014 0.011 -0.009 0.010
2.31 0.59 0.46 -0.29 0.38
Highly skilled -0.069 ** -0.062 -0.062 -0.060 -0.088 **
-1.97 -1.52 -1.51 -1.60 -2.08
Independent workers -0.003 -0.033 -0.039 -0.058 -0.059
-0.10 -0.81 -0.95 -1.46 -1.37
Skilled+low skilled -0.096 *** -0.067 * -0.150 *** -0.155 *** -0.162 ***
-2.77 -1.66 -3.61 -3.77 -3.72
High education -0.326 *** -0.155 *** -0.117 ** -0.132 ** -0.082
-7.09 -2.87 -2.16 -2.40 -1.44
Intermediate educ. -0.202 *** -0.111 *** -0.078 ** -0.071 ** -0.059 *
-7.23 -3.49 -2.42 -2.23 -1.79
Overconfidence 0.165 *** 0.173 *** 0.126 *** 0.104 **
4.64 5.16 2.99 2.44
Better than average -0.053
-1.41
Disposition 0.531 *** 0.539 *** 0.528 *** 0.532 *** 0.526 ***
17.14 17.71 16.86 16.84 16.69
Gambling 0.121 *** 0.273 *** 0.088 ** 0.075 * 0.071 *
3.21 9.12 2.27 1.81 1.78
Risk-lover 0.039 0.192 *** 0.045 0.036 0.049
0.95 5.35 1.08 0.81 1.12
Literacy 0.317 *** 0.317 *** 0.315 ***
8.12 7.35 7.90
Low return 0.044 0.091 *** 0.048
1.39 3.45 1.44
Deposit 0.015 0.015 0.010
0.58 0.58 0.38
Mortgage -0.193 *** -0.197 *** -0.201 ***
-5.74 -5.82 -5.81
Loan 0.074 * 0.074 * 0.095 **
1.94 1.85 2.35
Nº obs with Y=1 1 729 1 729 1 729 1 729 1 729 1 702
Nº observations 129 461 129 461 129 461 129 449 129 449 52 766
LR stat. 605 4 301 4 196 4 401 4 393 1 736
Prob. 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Obs: (i) z-stats in italics ; (ii) *, ** and *** denote statistical significance 
at 10%, 5% and 1% respectively; (iii) the models include a constant as well.
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use Goetzmann and Massa’s (2008) methodology. Firstly, each transaction in stocks is clas-
sified as “trade at loss” or “trade at gain”.11 Then, for each stock in the portfolio, a time 
series of the trades at loss and at gain is constructed. For example, when the investor sells 
a stock, the difference between the sell price and the price at which the previous purchase 
of that stock occurred is computed. If the difference is negative (sale price lower than the 
buy price), the sale is recorded at loss, and positive differences are recorded as sale at gain. 
Buys are treated similarly; in these cases the price that occurred in the previous trade of 
the same stock (regardless of it being a sale or a purchase) is used as the reference price. 
Given that disposition investors tend to sell winning stocks (that is, sell at gain) and buy 
losing stocks (that is, buy at loss), for each stock we compute the ratio between buys at loss 
plus sells at gain minus sells at loss minus buys at gain, standardized by the sum of buy at 
loss, buy at gain, sell at loss and sell at gain. Finally, we add up the difference for all stocks 
in the portfolio: if the ratio is positive, then the investor exhibits disposition effect; if not 
positive, the investor does not exhibit disposition effect. Thus, disposition = 1 if the com-
puted ratio is positive, and zero otherwise. We conclude from column [2] that disposition 
prone investors are more likely to buy and trade warrants. 
On the other hand, some investors seem to view trading in the stock market as an 
opportunity to gamble. For instance, Barber et al. (2009) document that the introduction 
of the government-sponsored lottery in Taiwan did reduce the stock market turnover by 
about a quarter, apparently showing that part of the individual investors’ excessive trading 
is motivated by the desire to gamble. Gambling may thus justify investors’ irrationality when 
participating in the warrant market. In fact, retail investors may decide not to be informed 
about product complexity and thus choose randomly with the help of commission-based 
incentivized distributors (Bernard et al. 2011, Campbell 2006). One way to account for this 
behavioral bias is to consider that investors who do not get any information about financial 
markets and instruments are gamblers and make random decisions. The gambling binary 
variable is the proxy used; it is equal to one if the investor does not use any source to get 
information about financial markets and instruments.12 We find that the gambling attitude 
                                                 
11 We assume that the last shares bought are the first ones to be sold to identify sales at loss.  
12 In the Annex we describe how this variable was calculated.  
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leads more investors to buy and trade warrants, and this is evidence of a behavioural bias 
in this market. 
Finally, there are investors who claim to be risk-lovers. When asked “What are the 
reasons that led to a concrete investment decision in financial markets” they state that the 
main reason why they invest (or have invested) is because they love risk. Controlling for 
this investor treat13, we conclude that the risk-loving attitude does not have an impact on 
investors’ participation in the warrant market. However, this result could be driven by col-
linearity. In fact, a strand of the literature considers that women are more risk averse than 
men in financial decision making (Schubert et al 1999, Croson and Gneezy 2009).14 If this is 
the case, then some collinearity may exist between the male and the risk-lover variables. 
Results from column [3] (regression with the behavioral variables only) somewhat confirm 
this possibility, as the risk-lover variable becomes statistically significant (and positive). We 
thus conclude that there are signs that the risk-loving attitude of individual investors leads 
them towards investment in warrants. 
In Models [4] and [5] we add a few additional controls: the investor’s level of finan-
cial literacy, whether there are savings accounts, consumer loans and mortgages, and the 
investor’s past performance in the investment in stocks. The literacy variable distinguishes 
investors who may have greater knowledge of financial matters because of their academic 
education (economists) or occupation (business managers and bank staff); it is a binary 
variable equal to 1 if the account holder is an economist, business manager or bank officer, 
and identifies those investors who are more likely to be financially educated because of 
their closer ‘proximity’ with financial issues. Agarwal and Mazumder (2013), for example, 
explicitly link cognitive abilities to financial mistakes, and Agarwal et al. (2010) claim that 
consumers make financial mistakes because they lack sufficient knowledge about financial 
concepts and instruments to make informed financial decisions. Also, Hilgert et al. (2003) 
find that those who have more financial knowledge are more likely to engage in recom-
mended financial practices 
                                                 
13 In the Annex we describe how we calculated the risk-lover binary variable. 
14 However, Nelson (2015) has a different view and claims that “The results are considerably more mixed and 
overlapping than might be expected”. 
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As regards savings accounts (deposit), consumer loans (loan) and mortgages (mort-
gage), these are likely to influence the wealth of the investor and her financial behavior. 
These are binary variables, equal to 1 if the investor has a savings account, consumer loan 
or a mortgage.15 The hypothesis that the performance achieved by investors in the stock 
market influences the investment in warrants is also tested. The underlying idea is that this 
performance can help identify the ability of the investor in making informed investment 
decisions and therefore leads these investors to 'test' their skills with other types of finan-
cial instruments. Alternatively, it can be argued that investors with the worst performance 
invest more readily in warrants, which are more leveraged than stocks, in order to recover 
losses suffered. Thus, dummy variables are defined (one for each quartile of performance) 
that cover the spectrum of distribution of performance of equity investments. Lacking in-
formation on the composition of the investment portfolio of each investor, the methodol-
ogy of Seru et al. (2008) is followed and we measure the performance of investors by the 
30-day average return of stocks purchased. Accordingly, low return is a binary variable, 
equal to 1 if the investor had a return on the investment in stocks in the lowest quartile of 
returns.  
These controls allow us to conclude that investors with greater knowledge of finan-
cial matters are more likely to participate in the warrant market. Moreover, investors with 
a mortgage have a lower probability of investing in warrants, but those with a consumer 
loan are more likely to invest in warrants. As for savings deposits, its estimated coefficient 
is positive but not statistically significant. On the other hand, lower returns from the invest-
ment in stocks are associated with higher odds of investing in warrants, which suggests that 
the investment in warrants may be speculative in nature or even a second-best solution in 
an attempt to obtain better returns on investments in financial markets.  
More importantly, all the estimated coefficients of the behavioral variables in model 
[4] retain their positive sign, and all but one (the risk-lover) are statistically significant at 
the usual levels of significance. Alternatively, if we use the better than average concept 
(instead of overconfidence) and assume that better than average investors are those who 
                                                 
15 We do not have information on the amount of the savings deposit, or consumer loan or mortgage. 
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believe that they know more than they do, this being measured by the difference, if posi-
tive, between self-reported financial knowledge and actual financial knowledge,16 we find 
(model [5]) that the better than average effect does not have an impact on the participation 
decision.  
Finally, model [6] allows us to check the robustness of our results. In this case, we 
restrict the sample a bit further, and omit what we call ‘curious’ investors, that is, investors 
with only one trade in stocks or in warrants. With the exception of two variables (highly 
skilled and high education), the other independent variables remain statistically significant 
and they all have the same sign as in model [4]. 
All in all, we conclude that investors with the studied behavioral biases 
(overconfident, disposition-prone, disposed to gambling and risk loving) are more likely to 
invest in warrants.  
 
4. The Trading Activity of Investors 
Once conditioned to the decision to participate in the warrant market, the investor 
may trade rather frequently. Liquidity does not seem to be a distinguishing factor of the 
stock and the warrant markets in Portugal (Mendes 2012). In this section we study whether 
the same investors have a different trading activity when they trade different instruments 
(stocks and warrants). In particular, we study the impact of investors’ behavioural biases on 
their trading activity in both types of financial instruments.  Prior research has studied in-
vestor financial behaviour but, to the best of our knowledge, the behaviour of the same 
investors in different markets (trading different financial instruments) has not been studied 
previously. In our sample we have 1,572 investors who trade stocks and warrants, and we 
focus our attention on these investors. 
Our dependent variable is the number of warrant (or stock) trades an investor makes 
during the sample period. The corresponding negative binomial count model is estimated 
by maximum likelihood, and the independent variables are those from the previous section. 
The results are shown in Table 2.  
                                                 
16 See the Annex for a more complete description of the better than average variable. 
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Table 2 models [7], [9] and [11] allow one to conclude that although investors are 
the same in both markets, the sociodemographic determinants of the trading activity in 
stocks and in warrants are not all the same, implying that the same investors trade (domes-
tic and foreign) stocks differently than warrants. For example, married investors trade war-
rants less actively, but do not trade stocks less actively. Similarly, investors living in the larg-
est metropolitan areas have higher warrant trading activity but have similar stock trading 
activity than investors not living in the largest metropolitan areas.  
 























[7] [8] [9] [10] [11] [12]
Age 0.156 *** 0.133 *** 0.141 *** 0.128 *** 0.140 *** 0.127 ***
9.96 7.67 13.52 10.41 13.28 10.27
Age squared -0.0011 *** -0.0013 *** -0.0012 *** -0.0010 *** -0.0012 *** -0.0010 ***
-9.58 -7.45 -10.51 -7.99 -10.37 -7.92
Male 0.183 ** 0.154 0.191 ** 0.138 0.184 ** 0.135
2.04 1.47 2.33 1.52 2.23 1.49
Married -0.224 *** -0.160 * 0.038 0.103 0.088 0.152 **
-3.14 -1.93 0.57 1.37 1.34 2.08
Lisbon+Porto 0.132 ** 0.132 ** -0.026 0.007 0.004 0.033
2.30 2.06 -0.46 0.12 0.07 0.57
Highly skilled 0.078 0.017 0.051 0.054 0.079 0.088
0.79 0.14 0.57 0.52 0.86 0.85
Independent workers -0.190 ** -0.241 ** -0.174 * -0.160 -0.161 * -0.152
-2.02 -2.26 -1.90 -1.59 -1.77 -1.51
Skilled+low skilled -0.527 *** -0.602 *** -0.327 *** -0.326 *** -0.311 *** -0.310 ***
-5.35 -5.33 -3.50 -3.07 -3.28 -2.88
High education -0.243 -0.281 -0.344 * -0.285 -0.395 ** -0.336 *
-1.49 -1.60 -1.84 -1.44 -2.12 -1.71
Intermediate educ. 0.133 ** 0.116 -0.128 * -0.134 * -0.122 * -0.137 *
1.97 1.63 -1.76 -1.70 -1.71 -1.75
Overconfidence 0.163 * -0.166 ** -0.102
1.65 -2.18 -1.35
Disposition 0.351 *** -0.107 -0.100
3.41 -1.41 -1.34
Gambling 0.157 * 0.126 0.130
1.65 1.36 1.44
Risk-lover -0.034 -0.143 * -0.141
-0.34 -1.66 -1.62
Nº observations 1 572 1 572 1 572 1 572 1 572 1 572
LR stat. 255 677 375 708 382 722
Prob. 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Obs: (i) z-stats in italics ; (ii) *, ** and *** denote statistical significance 
at 10%, 5% and 1% respectively; (iii) the models include a constant as well.
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Furthermore, we also reveal some disturbing results related to academic education: 
investors with 4 to 12 years of education trade more warrants than highly educated inves-
tors, but more academic education lowers the stock trading activity of investors. As Abreu 
and Mendes (2010) put it, “the general level of education is also fundamental for obtaining 
a correct perception of financial information and available opportunities, as well as being 
crucial in the decision-making process” (p. 517), and we expected the level of academic 
education to have a similar impact on the trading activity of stocks and warrants. 
The difference between the investors’ characteristics that make them trade more in 
each market is even clearer when behavioral variables are included (models [8], [10] and 
[12]). In fact, the impact of the behavioral biases is different when investors trade stocks 
than when they trade warrants. This fundamental finding enables us to conclude that in-
vestors behave differently in each financial market according to their behavioral bias char-
acteristics: overconfident investors have a higher warrant trading activity and a lower do-
mestic stock trading activity, investors pursuing gambling pleasure or prone to the disposi-
tion effect trade warrants more (but do not trade stocks more). Finally, the risk-loving atti-
tude decreases the number of domestic stock trades, but does not affect the warrant trad-
ing activity. Thus, although there are signs that the trading activity in warrants is driven by 
rational motives (notice the sign and statistical significance of the coefficient of occupation 
variable, for example), we conclude that the behavioral biases have a stronger impact on 
the trading activity in more complex financial instruments.   
 
5. Robustness Issues 
We conduct a series of robustness tests. First, we include the controls used in section 
3 (Table 3, models [13], [15] and [17]). Next, we control for the time span during which the 
investor was active in the market (period of activity), and consider that the investors’ trading 
activity starts when the investor makes their first trade, and assume they remain active until 
the last day of the sample. Differently from Abreu (2017), rather than computing the 
average number of trades the investor makes, we use this new variable as an additional 
regressor as it adds flexibility to our model (Table 3, models [14], [16] and [18]).17  
                                                 
17 We omit the socio-demographic variables in the interest of space. 
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Our estimated models gain explanatory power: some (or all) of these additional 
controls are significant at the usual significance levels. The impact of the low return, deposit 
and loan variables is similar for all the estimated models in terms of the respective 
coefficient sign (but not in terms of the statistical relevance), and investors seem to use 
consumer loans to leverage their stock and warrant trading activity. Some other investors’ 
characteristics affect the trading of warrants and the trading of stocks differently. For 
instance, financial literacy is associated with higher warrant trading activity and with lower 
stock trading activity.  Similarly, whilst having a mortgage is positively associated with 
warrant trading activity, it is also negatively associated with stock trading activity. In 
addition, the longer the investor’s period of activity the lower her warrant trading activity 
and the higher level of stock trading.   
 
Table 3 – Additional Results 
 
 
More importantly, however, these additional controls confirm dissimilar investor 





















[13] [14] [15] [16] [17] [18]
Overconfidence 0.217 * 0.231 ** 0.136 0.142 0.184 * 0.185 *
1.91 2.00 1.29 1.34 1.84 1.89
Disposition 0.389 *** 0.434 *** -0.033 -0.245 ** -0.023 -0.200 **
3.84 4.10 -0.35 -2.52 -0.25 -2.17
Gambling 0.197 ** 0.238 ** 0.122 0.135 0.132 0.140
2.08 2.41 1.26 1.30 1.42 1.44
Risk-lover -0.005 0.015 -0.122 -0.139 -0.118 -0.127
-0.04 0.14 -1.34 -1.36 -1.32 -1.27
Literacy 0.442 *** 0.496 *** -0.154 -0.292 ** -0.162 -0.283 **
3.80 4.22 -1.35 -2.51 -1.45 -2.52
Low return -0.207 ** -0.204 ** -0.549 *** *** -0.542 *** -0.552 *** *** -0.550 ***
-2.55 -2.54 -5.77 -5.56 -6.24 -6.18
Deposit -0.340 *** -0.303 *** -0.113 -0.153 -0.128 -0.164 *
-4.50 -3.99 -1.23 -1.64 -1.41 -1.80
Mortgage 0.188 * 0.216 ** -0.141 -0.212 * -0.137 -0.203 *
1.93 2.14 -1.14 -1.73 -1.14 -1.74
Loan 0.610 *** 0.615 *** 0.198 * * 0.243 ** 0.243 ** ** 0.290 ***
6.29 6.40 1.89 2.36 2.42 3.00
Period of Activity -0.0002 *** 0.0006 *** 0.0006 ***
-3.67 12.18 11.43
Nº observations 1 572 1 572 1 5721 572 1 572 1 5721 572 1 572
LR stat. 782 804 776 382 796 997
Prob. 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Obs: (i) z-stats in italics ; (ii) *, ** and *** denote statistical significance 
at 10%, 5% and 1% respectively; (iii) the models include a constant and the sociodemographic variables as well.
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trade warrants more and trade stocks less, and investors with a gambling attitude also trade 
warrants more actively. Also, overconfident investors trade both warrants and foreign 
stocks more actively than they trade domestic stocks.  
Two additional robustness exercises are performed. In the first exercise, we use the 
better than average proxy, rather than the overconfidence variable. In the second, we use 
a time (year) variable18 (instead of the period of activity variable) to control for the state of 
the market at the time of the investor’s first trade. Results are essentially unchanged and 
are not reported.19  
 
6. Concluding remarks 
In this paper, we investigate the hypothesis that investors behave differently in differ-
ent financial markets. More specifically, we compare the financial activity of investors hold-
ing both warrants and stocks in their portfolio.  We are particularly interested in studying if 
investors with particularly important financial behavioral biases behave differently in differ-
ent markets.  
We begin by characterizing the profile of warrant investors. Results show that single, 
male investors with lower academic qualifications are more likely to participate in the war-
rant market. Moreover, we find that investors with a consumer loan and those with lower 
returns from previous investments are more likely to invest in warrants. On the other hand, 
investors with a mortgage exhibit a lower probability of investing in warrants. More im-
portantly, investors with studied behavioral biases (overconfident, disposition-prone, gam-
bling attitude and risk loving investors) are more likely to invest in warrants. 
Secondly, we study the investors’ trading behavior in the warrant market and in the 
stock market. Even though investors are the same in both markets, our results clearly show 
that the sociodemographic determinants of trading activity in stocks and in warrants are 
not all the same, this evidence indicates that the same investors trade (domestic and for-
eign) stocks differently than warrants. More precisely, overconfident investors have a higher 
warrant trading activity and a lower domestic stock trading activity, investors searching for 
                                                 
18 Year of the first trade of the investor. 
19 Results are available from the authors upon request. 
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the pleasure of gambling or prone to the disposition effect trade warrants more (but do not 
trade stocks more). These results are original, since, as far as we know, this is the first study 
to address investor’s behavior in the market of different financial instruments. 
Our results are robust to the consideration of investors’ financial literacy and past per-
formance in the stock market, to the inclusion of a series of control variables regarding in-
vestors’ financial profile (time deposits, mortgages and consumer loans) and the consider-
ation of the time span during which the investor was active in the market.  
We also find that there are a significant number of active investors with low educational 
levels, less qualified occupations or of an older age, which means that the investment in 
this complex financial instrument might not be the most appropriate. In this context, and 
combined with the behavioral biases that can lead to unsound decision making, financial 
intermediaries have a fundamental role to ascertain (for all potential investors in warrants 
and not just for the average investor) whether this financial instrument is indeed appropri-
ate to their knowledge and risk profile. Furthermore, the Markets in Financial Instruments 
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We use the CMVM survey to construct proxies for the better than average, gambling 
and risk-lover variables. We define better than average based on the question: “How do 
you rate, on a 1 (very low) to 7 (very high) scale, your own knowledge of financial assets 
and markets?” (Self-evaluation). Answers to this question are compared with a financial 
knowledge variable, which comes out of the survey as well. If the difference between self-
reported and actual knowledge is positive and greater than 0.9 then better than average = 
1. We then regress this overconfidence variable on a set of socio-demographic investor 
characteristics. The estimated coefficients of this model are used to estimate whether in-
vestors in our trading database are/aren’t better than average, using the same socio-demo-
graphic investor characteristics, and assuming that the percentage of better than average 
investors is equal to the percentage of better than average investors in the survey. Thus, 
better than average = 1 for the investors with the higher score in the estimated overconfi-
dent model.  
Similar procedures are used to construct the gambling and risk-lover variables. From 
the survey we define the socio-demographic characteristics of the investors who do not use 
any source of information to become informed on financial markets and products (investors 
with a gambling attitude), and those of investors who claim to have a risk-loving attitude. 
Assuming that the percentage of gambler (risk-lover) investors in the survey and in the main 
database are similar we define that gambling = 1 (risk lover = 1) for the investors with the 
higher score in the estimated gambler (risk lover) model. 
